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Abstract
Protecting Audit Data Using Segmentation-based Anonymization for
Multi-tenant Cloud Auditing (SegGuard)
Momen Oqaily
With the rise of security concerns regarding cloud computing, the importance of secu-
rity auditing, conducted either in-house or by a third party, has become evident more
than ever. However, the input data required for auditing a multi-tenant cloud environ-
ment typically contains sensitive information, such as the topology of the underlying
cloud infrastructure. Additionally, audit results intended for one tenant may unex-
pectedly reveal private information, such as unpatched security flaws, about other
tenants. How to anonymize audit data and results in order to prevent such informa-
tion leakage is a novel challenge that has received little attention. Directly applying
most existing anonymization techniques to such a context would either lead to insuffi-
cient protection or render the data unsuitable for auditing. In this thesis, we propose
SegGuard, a novel anonymization approach that protects the sensitive information in
both the audit data and auditing results, while assuring the data utility for effective
auditing. Specifically, SegGuard prevents cross-tenant information leakage through
per-tenant encryption, and it prevents information leakage to auditors through an
innovative way of applying property-preserving anonymization. We apply SegGuard
on audit data collected from an OpenStack cloud, and evaluate its effectiveness and
efficiency using both synthetic and real data. Our experimental results demonstrate
that SegGuard can reduce information leakage to a negligible level (e.g., less than
iii
1% for an adversary with 50% pre-knowledge) with a practical response time (e.g., 62
seconds to anonymize a cloud virtual infrastructure with 25,000 virtual machines).
iv
Acknowledgments
I would like first to express my special thanks of gratitude to my thesis advisor Prof.
Lingyu Wang, as well as to my co-supervisor Prof. Mourad Debbabi. They gave me
the golden opportunity and helped me in doing a lot of research and I came to know
about so many new things. Their continuous guidance, support and encouragement
helped me the most to finish this thesis work. They always understand my needs and
problems, provides me with endless help and try there best to give me generous and
wise pieces of advice. Furthermore, Prof. Lingyu Wang was my godfather during this
long journey. His way of thinking, inspiring words and kindness changed my life a lot
not only at the research level but at the personal level also. Personally speaking, I
feel very proud and unique to be one of his students.
I would also like to thank my lab mates and researchers from Ericson represented
by the Audit Cloud Ready members. Special thanks to Amir Alimohammadifar,
Suryadipta Majumdar, Meisam Mohamady and Yosr Jarraya from Ericson, who were
very cooperative with me from the very beginning of my master’s program and gave
me a lot of their time and effort. In all honesty, their invaluable support and guidance
helped me a lot for completing my master’s thesis.
I am also deeply indebted to my respected teachers and all other faculty members
of the CIISE department. My words have no bounds in expressing their professional-
ism and kindness that I felt during the courses that I attended during my master’s.
Finally, I submit my heartiest gratitude to my parents and to my family members
v
for their love, support and continuous encouragement from the beginning of my years
of study, they all kept me going. I wish that by accomplishing this achievement I
bring some of the thoughts in your minds to a reality and I promise you to do my
best to achieve more and more. I also humbly extend my thanks to all concerned
persons who supported me in this regard.
vi
Contents
List of Figures x
List of Tables xii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Thesis Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Preliminaries and Related Work 9
2.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.1 Property Preserving Encryption (PPE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.2 Compositional Auditing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 Models 15
3.1 System Model and Trust Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 In-scope Threats and Adversarial Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.1 Adversarial Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2.2 Out-of-Scope Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
vii
4 SegGuard System 19
4.1 Main Idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3.1 Per-Tenant Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3.2 Data Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3.3 Utility Preserving Anonymization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3.4 Multi-View Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3.5 Per-Tenant Report Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5 Implementation 35
5.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.2 SegGuard Integration into OpenStack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.3 Encryption algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6 Security Analysis 39
6.1 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1.1 Security of the Topology Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1.2 Security of the Sensitives Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.2 Utility Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.3 Security of the Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7 Discussions 46
7.1 Computational Cost and Benign Auditor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.2 Colluding Adversaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.3 Auditing Static Cloud Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.4 Communication and Storage Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.5 Formal Treatment and Applicability on Different Attributes . . . . . 48
viii
7.6 Use-Cases of SegGuard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8 Experiments 50
8.1 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.2 Information Leakage under Semantic Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.2.1 Impact of Varying the Number of Segments . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.2.2 Impact of Varying the Number of Real Segments/View . . . . 51
8.2.3 Impact of Varying the Adversary Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.2.4 Impact of Varying the Number of VMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.3 Topology Preservation in Real Cloud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.4 Efficiency of SegGuard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8.4.1 Time Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8.4.2 Memory and CPU Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57





1 An example of configuration data collected from different OpenStack
cloud services about VMs and their networks of two different tenants
(e.g., ID: 1234 and ID: 5678). The upper (resp. lower) table represents
the configuration of the tenants’ topologies (resp. VMs’ security group
rules). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 A summary of trust relationships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3 An overview of SegGuard approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4 Network topologies inferred from two generated views (together with
the encrypted SGR table not shown here): (a) topology related to first
view in Table 7, (b) topology related to second view in Table 8. The
gray dashed lines are fake and boldface dashed lines are real. . . . . . 31
5 A high-level architecture of SegGuard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6 Information leakage of SegGuard under frequency analysis attack while
varying the number of segments. The adversary knowledge to 25%, the
number of VMs to 10K and the number of real segments per view to 2. 52
7 Information leakage of SegGuard under frequency analysis attack while
varying the number of real segments/view. The adversary knowledge
to 25%, the number of VMs to 10K, the number of segments to 10. . 53
x
8 Information leakage of SegGuard under frequency analysis attack while
varying the adversary knowledge. The number of VMs to 10K, the
number of segments to 10, and the number of real segments per view
to 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
9 Information leakage of SegGuard under frequency analysis attack while
varying the number of segments. The adversary knowledge to 25%, the
number of segments to 10, and the number of real segments per view
to 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
10 Network topology corresponds to two different views selected randomly
from the views generated by SegGuard; where we set the Nseg to 4 and
the Nseg−view to 2. The total number of tenants in figure B is 131 while
in C it is 107, which are different from the real settings. . . . . . . . . 59
11 Efficiency of SegGuard: Measuring (a) Time while varying the num-
ber of segments and measuring (b) Time while varying the size of the
domain of the random number. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
12 Efficiency of SegGuard: Measuring time while varying the size of the
domain of the random number. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
13 Efficiency of SegGuard: Measuring CPU consumption consumption
while varying the number of segments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
14 Efficiency of SegGuard: Measuring Memory consumption while vary-
ing the number of segments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
xi
List of Tables
1 Summary of existing anonymization solutions and their main weaknesses. 14
2 The CSP side. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3 The auditor side (where shaded IPs are utility-preserving and lead to
valid auditing results). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4 Encrypted data corresponding to the original configuration table of
Figure 1 performed by the CSP using KT1 (unshaded rows) and KT2
(shaded rows). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5 SegLog corresponding to the encrypted and segmented data of Table 4
performed at the CSP side. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6 SegLogp after permutation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7 First view generated by the auditor. Shaded segments are real segments
(between which equality or shared prefixes are preserved) and unshaded
rows are fake ones. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8 Second view generated by the auditor. Shaded segments are real seg-
ments and unshaded rows are fake ones. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9 Excerpt of ReportPrep prepared by the CSP for the integration of the
first two reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
10 Final report for Tenant1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11 Final decrypted report for Tenant1. Shaded cells are decrypted cells




Cloud computing environments are becoming widely adapted, which leads to an in-
crease in the fear factor about its security and privacy concerns among its tenants.
To ensure the security of a multi-tenant cloud, a cloud service provider (CSP) usually
performs security auditing of their virtual infrastructure, either in-house by a cloud
security admin or by an appointed third-party auditor, in order to detect threats
and vulnerabilities as well as to assess the compliance of the cloud environment with
respect to security standards and regulations [24]. When done properly, security
auditing may help the CSP in remedying security breaches and compliance viola-
tions [48].
On the other hand, auditing may pose unique security challenges in a multi-tenant
cloud environment. First, most auditing tasks would require the CSP to grant audi-
tors accesses to data about both the cloud physical infrastructure and the tenants’
virtual infrastructures. Second, auditing results intended for one tenant may unwill-
ingly include data about other tenants due to the multi-tenancy nature of clouds.
In both cases, the data may carry sensitive and private information, such as private
IP addresses, virtual network topologies, and inter-tenant communication patterns.
Furthermore, such data may contain explicit tenant identifiers, which are used to
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relate virtual resources to specific cloud customers owning those resources. Those
identifiers, used in conjunction with auxiliary knowledge (e.g., customer databases),
may be used to connect the sensitive information contained in audit data or audit
results to real world customers, leading to violation of privacy regulations (such as
the newly adopted GDPR [11]). Additionally, there exist more sensitive attributes,
e.g., routing rules, security group rules, which may be captured by an adversary to
understand the security policies used by a given tenant and abuse it to parasitize or
even disrupt services of other tenants or to take down some services supplied by the
cloud service provider [13]. On the other hand, auditing results can only be reliable
if the data provided to the auditor is accurate and complete. Thus, preserving util-
ity with respect to the security auditing tasks is of a paramount importance in the
context of cloud auditing.
To the best of our knowledge, the issue of preserving privacy for security audit-
ing in clouds has largely been ignored so far in the literature. There exist cloud
security auditng approaches, which typically ignore the privacy issues altogether and
consequently assume a trusted central auditor who does not disclose any sensitive
information about other entities and the audit outputs cannot be misused. However,
this assumption is impractical and somewhat threatening especially in the cloud en-
vironment since both virtual network infrastructure and physical resources could be
shared among different tenants with different levels of trust. On the other hand, most
existing privacy preserving techniques in the context of general purpose network traces
and data anonymization, are applying stringent privacy protection mechanisms. For
instance, they can not anonymize network topology, but only low level information,
e.g., IPs, and they cannot preserve important relationships between data attributes.
However, scarifying sensitive information from the anonymized data or intentionally
breaking the inherent relationships, are defeating the auditing purposes. Hence, any
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loss in the data utility leads to inconsistency and incorrectness in the auditing results.
In the following, we further motivate these through an example.
In the following section, we demonstrate such threats to security and privacy
from audit data and audit results, as well as the importance of utility preservation
for auditing through an example.
1.1 Motivation
Figure 1 illustrates two tables containing sample audit data collected from the con-
figuration databases of different services of OpenStack [37] in a multi-tenant cloud
environment. For simplicity, we only show data belonging to Tenant1 (Tenant-ID:
1234 ) and Tenant2 (Tenant-ID: 5678 ). As an example auditing task, we consider the
verification of reachability between all pairs of virtual machines (VMs). The upper
table of Figure 1, called the configuration data table, contains attributes about the
virtual networks and their VMs, such as the tenant identifier, the virtual network
identifier, the VM identifier, the private and public IPs corresponding to that VM,
the virtual router ID connecting the network to other subnets, and the next hop
router. The lower table of Figure 1, called the security group rule table (SGR), shows
the security group rules associated with the VMs shown in the above configuration
table. Sharing such configuration data as-is may give rise to following security and
privacy concerns.
1. Upon receiving the configuration table, an auditor can aggregate the data to
construct the entire topology of the cloud infrastructure as shown in Figure 1.
Any leakage of such information by a dishonest third party auditor or careless
insider might cause serious consequences to the CSP, including further attacks
enabled by knowledge about the topology (e.g., topology poisoning and DoS)
3
Configuration Data Table
Net-ID VM-Private-IP VM-Public-IP Next-Hop RouterTenant-ID VM-ID
AB1 27.0.1.18 1.10.10.1 RG11234 CD1
AB2 27.0.2.9 1.10.10.2 RG11234 CD2
AB4 18.1.5.66 1.10.6.4 RG25678 CD4
AB3 27.0.3.27 1.10.10.3 EF21234 CD3












































Inferred  Network 
Topology
Tenant-1234
 VM-CD1 is reachable 
from my VM-CD5
Auditor
Figure 1: An example of configuration data collected from different OpenStack cloud
services about VMs and their networks of two different tenants (e.g., ID: 1234 and
ID: 5678). The upper (resp. lower) table represents the configuration of the tenants’
topologies (resp. VMs’ security group rules).
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[31].
2. The auditing results from reachability analysis intended for one tenant may also
contain sensitive information about other tenants. For example, the auditing
results may reveal that a Tenant1 VM CD1 is reachable from a Tenant2 VM
CD5 (as shown by the dashed line in Figure 1). Specifically, VM CD1 (first
record of configuration table) is associated with the security group rule (first
record of SGR table) that allows the remote connection from 1.10.6.5 (fifth
row in configuration table), which is the public IP of VM CD5. Disclosing such
information may potentially breach the service level agreement (SLA) of Tenant
1 and invite further attacks from a (malicious) user of Tenant2 by exploiting
the discovered reachability between CD1 and CD5.
3. At the same time, sufficient utility must be preserved in the data to allow an
auditor to perform the desired reachability analysis. For instance, the configura-
tion table shows that CD2 and CD3 belong to the same tenant (i.e., Tenant-ID:
1234), and the second record of the SGR table shows that CD2 is reachable by
CD3 because its security group rule allows traffic from IP 27.0.3.27. Such a
reachability analysis will be possible if the common Tenant-ID attribute can be
used to join the two tables together. For this reason, randomization or encryp-
tion techniques that destroy such an equality property will not be applicable.
On the other hand, we notice that, as long as certain properties (e.g., equality
between Tenant-IDs and shared prefixes between IP addresses) are preserved,
we would be able to perform such auditing tasks on anonymized (encrypted)
data.
To that end, many works have focused on property-preserving anonymization
of network trace data (a more detailed review of related works will be given in
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section 2.2). For example, the so-called prefix-preserving anonymization technique
anonymizes IP addresses by replacing them with random-looking IPs, while preserv-
ing the shared prefixes such that IPs within the same subnet would remain so after
the anonymization [21]. However, such techniques are known to be vulnerable to the
so-called semantic attacks in which adversaries may expand their prior knowledge
about certain IPs to other IPs sharing the same prefixes even if all the IPs have
been anonymized. Other solutions tradeoff utility for security (e.g., suppression and
bucketization [40], and aggregation with perturbation [34]). Directly applying those
existing techniques to address the unique challenges of anonymizing audit data and
audit results, as demonstrated above, would either suffer from the same semantic
attacks or fail to meet the utility requirements of auditing (e.g., suppression, bucke-
tization, or aggregation and perturbation may all prevent the reachability analysis in
our example).
1.2 Thesis Statement
In this thesis, we present, SegGuard, a novel anonymization approach that prevents
the sensitive and private information in both audit data and audit results from being
disclosed to semi-trusted auditors and tenants, while preserving sufficient data utility
to facilitate effective security auditing. Our key ideas are twofold. First, we employ
per-tenant encryption to ensure each tenant can benefit from useful auditing results
(e.g., a VM is reachable from other tenants’ VMs) without learning details about
other tenants’ resources (e.g., the exact IDs of other tenants or their VMs). Second,
we propose an innovative segmentation-based, layered encryption technique to ensure
auditors can perform the desired auditing tasks without learning either the original
configuration data or the auditing results. Specifically, we first divide the original
audit data into multiple segments, and then let the CSP and the auditor each apply
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a certain number of iterations of property-preserving encryption (PPE) [35] on each
segment. Our design ensures that, the total number of iterations of PPE (applied
by both the CSP and auditor) will be different for most segments (which means the
property is not preserved between those segments, namely, “fake” segments) except a
few selected segments (which receive the same number of iterations of PPE and hence
have their property preserved, namely, the “real” segments). Finally, the auditor will
perform the auditing tasks over all the segments, while s/he cannot tell which of
those segments (and hence their results) are real since the number of iterations of
PPE applied by the CSP is kept secret from him/her. On the other hand, the CSP
can secretly extract and integrate all the real auditing results and send them to the
tenants.
1.3 Contributions
Our main contributions in this work are as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort addressing the unique
challenges of protecting the security and privacy of both audit data and audit
results in a multi-tenancy cloud environment.
• Our per-tenant encryption solution allows tenants to benefit from auditing re-
sults without breaching other tenants’ privacy, which may help ease the privacy
concerns of both CSP and tenants in adopting security auditing solutions.
• Our segmentation-based, layered encryption technique allows semi-trusted au-
ditors to perform auditing on anonymized data without learning either the de-
tailed configuration information or auditing results, which reduces the risk of
leaking such sensitive information and also makes it easier for CSP to outsource
the auditing tasks to specialized third party providers.
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• We present detailed methodology, describe our implementation based on Open-
Stack, and evaluate our solution through experiments using both synthetic and
real data. The results demonstrate our solution can reduce the level of infor-
mation leakage to a negligible level with practical response time (e.g., less than
1% information leakage for adversaries armed with 50% pre-knowledge, and less
than 62 seconds required for anonymizing a cloud infrastructure with 25k VMs).
1.4 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background
information and reviews the related works. In Chapter 3 we provide our threat model.
Chapter 4 presents the proposed solution. Chapter 5 discusses the implementation
details. Chapter 6 analyzes the security, privacy, and utility, and discusses other
aspects of our approach. Chapter 8 gives our experimental results. Finally, Chapter 9
discusses the limitations and concludes this work.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries and Related Work
The first part of this chapter provides preliminaries of our work and the second part
discusses literature related to our work.
2.1 Preliminaries
This section provides an extensive overview and give background information about
some exisiting anonymization techniques and auditing method that we use in our
work.
2.1.1 Property Preserving Encryption (PPE)
In this work, we focus on auditing tasks that can be performed on anonymized data.
For example, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, the reachability analysis relies on the
equality (between Tenant-IDs, VM-IDs, etc.) and prefix preserving properties (be-
tween the IP addresses). The equality property can be achieved through deterministic
encryption (i.e., the same plaintext always leads to the same ciphertext under the
same key), whereas the prefix preserving property can be achieved through special
encryption techniques (detailed below). Other auditing tasks may require additional
9
properties and PPE techniques [35, 2], such as order-preserving encryption (i.e., ci-
phertext will preserve the order of the plaintext [5]). In the remainder of this work,
we will focus on the equality and prefix-preserving properties but our solution can be
adapted to incorporate other PPE techniques.
To facilitate further discussions, we briefly discuss one of the cryptography-based
PPE techniques, influenced by [51]. An anonymization function F is said to be prefix-
reserving, if, for any two IP addresses x and y originally sharing a K-bit prefix, their
anonymized versions, namely, F (x) and F (y), also share a K-bit prefix. The prefix
preserving function F is also deterministic (i.e., the same address appearing in dif-
ferent traces will be mapped to the same anonymized address under the same key,
which allows consistency in the anonymization process). Also, F must satisfy the
canonical form [51]: given that a = a1, a2 . . . a32 and F (a) = a1′, a2′ . . . a32′, we
have ai′ = ai⊕ fi−1(a1, a2, . . . , ai−1) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 32}, where fi is a cryptographic
function that takes as input a bit string of length (i − 1) and returns a single bit.
That is, the ith bit is anonymized based on a key and the preceding (i − 1) bits
in order to satisfy the prefix-preserving property. This scheme is known to be im-
mune against chosen-plaintext attacks if the encryption function is either stateful or
randomized [27].
2.1.2 Compositional Auditing
As mentioned in Chapter 1, we divide the audit data into segments on which the
auditing task will be performed, which makes our work more suitable for auditing
tasks that can be performed in a divide-and-conquer manner [18]. Specifically, instead
of auditing the entire input data in one shot, the data can be divided into smaller
chunks to be audited separately, before the partial auditing results are combined to
yield the same result as if the data was audited in one shot. For example, auditing
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the reachability between communicating devices (e.g., VMs) may be performed for
each pair in the dataset separately, then the results can be aggregated. Many other
common security properties are also compositional, such as virtual infrastructure-level
security properties (e.g., VM co-residence, cross-layer port consistency and common
ownership [26, 8, 36]), network-level security properties (e.g., loops, black-holes and
incorrect snapshot [28, 54]), and application-level properties (e.g., functional and
security-related [25]). Finally, since our divide-and-conquer approach resembles that
found in most existing parallel processing platforms (e.g., MapReduce [19]), a natural
extension is to integrate our approach with such platforms to further improve its
efficiency and scalability.
2.2 Related Work
The most widely used techniques for anonymizing network data are truncation, ran-
domization, quantization and pseudonymization. Truncation and randomization [9]
effectively destroy the semantics of the field they are applied to. One example is the
payload of packets, which might contain usernames and passwords that are removed
from the data as a standard practice. Quantization techniques [15], such as limiting
the precision of timestamps, are applied to reduce the information gained about the
identity of the workstations from timing attacks [38]. The most widely used technique,
pseudonymization [6], replaces IPs found in the data with linkable, prefix-preserving
pseudonyms. These pseudonyms preserve the hierarchical relationships found in the
prefixes of the original IPs. The underlying goal is to enable the analysis of packets
generated by hosts, or whole prefixes, without providing the actual IPs. However,
SegGuard does not replace or eliminate any data component that may affect the
auditing process. Furthermore, SegGuard preserves the utility and the relationship
in the real segments, such that their auditing results are error free.
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The problem of data outsourcing and privacy leakage has been addressed exten-
sively. Naveed et al. [35] studied the security of databases encrypted using PPE and
presented different types of attacks that allow an adversary to decrypt a large portion
of the encrypted data. The attack discussed therein was proposed by [7], where it
has been shown that an adversary with a pre-knowledge can deanonymize selected
addresses or subnets. However, we implemented and applied the same attack to test
our scheme and we found out, as shown in Chapter 8, that our solution is immune
against this type of attacks. Many information disclosure and information loss lim-
itation methods have been discussed in [20]. Samarati and Sweeney [42, 41] define
a complete framework for information disclosure control through the definition of K-
anonymity approach. Gehrke [33] proposes L-diversity approach, providing a certain
level of privacy even when the publisher does not know what kind of knowledge the
adversary possesses. However, K-anonymity and L-diversity do not prevent attribute
disclosure, especially when the table has multiple records belonging to one individ-
ual [33, 46, 50]. The (k,j)-obfuscation technique was introduced in [39]. Therein,
authors addressed the issue of sensitive data obfuscation in network flows by in-
troducing protection guarantees under realistic assumptions about the adversary’s
knowledge. In (k,j)-obfuscation, the data utility and information accuracy remain
challenging, as the shared data has been heavily sanitized (i.e., from each k flows,
having similar fingerprints, one flow is blurred). Chen et al. [12] address the problem
of privacy-preserving quantification of real network reachability across different do-
mains by preserving the privacy of access control configuration and access control lists
only (layer three devices). Ciriani et al. [49] tried to provide privacy guarantees when
sensitive information is stored, processed or shared to a second party through data
fragmentation and encryption. Their approach makes data ambiguous and unintel-
ligible using encryption. Contrary to all the above approaches, SegGuard preserves
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the utility of the data to be audited and returns valid results.
The loss of information/accuracy in data privacy preserving approaches due to
the trade-off between privacy and utility has always been considered as a major is-
sue. However, this loss cannot be tolerated in the case of auditing since any loss in
data utility will affect the auditing results accuracy. This problem has been tackled
in [12] and [14]. However, the main problem in the solution presented in [12] is that
it only considers the access control lists and routers configuration not covering the
virtual switches and virtual machines in the cloud environment. Hence, they do not
verify the topology of the verified network. In [14] they are using data encryption to
make the data unintelligible, and fragmentation as a way to break sensitive associ-
ations between information. However, there proposed solution used in data storing
applications where the stored data is completely unavailable without accessing the
encryption key. Finally, there are several works (e.g., [32, 3, 4]) that have been pro-
posed to verify the virtual infrastructure logs in the cloud. Most of them considering
the verification without focusing on the privacy concerns resulting from such process,
or they keep the door open for future work. For instance, in [48] authors propose
a scalable system for verifying cloud-wide VM-level isolation. This system returns,
as a result, the pairs of VMs that are reachable even if they belong to different ten-
ants. While this system assumes that the verification results do not disclose tenants’
sensitive information, SegGuard builds on the assumption that audit results may dis-
close any sensitive information across parties involved in the auditing and preserves
it by performing per-tenant data anonymization. In Table 1, we summarize the main
weaknesses of the existing solutions.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work proposed a cross-tenant privacy
preserving approach that not only preserves the privacy of the data but also of the
topology and relationships (e.g., topology of the virtual infrastructure) while ensuring
13
its utility.










In this chapter, we define our threat model and identify the trust relationships between
different stakeholders to be achieved with our proposal.
3.1 System Model and Trust Relationships
SegGuard threat model is similar to those used in existing works [45, 43, 55, 1]. First,
we define the stakeholders involved in the cloud service model as follows:
1. The cloud service provider (CSP): This is the entity providing paid services
and has a significant interest in protecting their reputation and building trust
to attract customers. We also differentiate between the CSP and the cloud
administrators as detailed below in the trust relationships.
2. The cloud tenants: Those are customers of the CSP and are concerned with
the security of their deployed virtual resources and the privacy of their sensitive
data.
3. The cloud auditor: This can be either the cloud administrators or third-party
auditors who have the expertise and capabilities needed to perform auditing.
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Our assumptions about the trust relationships between those stakeholders are
detailed in the following and depicted in Figure 2.
1. Tenants usually have to trust the CSP for protecting the security and privacy
related to both the audit data and the auditing results as part of the fulfillment
of the service level agreement (SLA).
2. A tenant (and CSP) does not trust other tenants with the received auditing
results (e.g., a tenant might misuse the results to launch attacks against other
tenants).
3. Tenants do not trust the auditors (cloud administrators or third-party), partic-
ularly, to have access to their sensitive data and confidential information (e.g.,
private IPs, virtual infrastructure topologies, etc.).
4. CSP does not trust the auditor to have access to non-protected audit data and
audit results as in [47, 10]. More precisely, auditors might have the technical
means and the financial motivation to misuse their privileges in order to extract
information from the audit data or from the audit results if they are allowed to
do so.
3.2 In-scope Threats and Adversarial Model
SegGuard aims at protecting information related to security and privacy that might
be extracted from the original audit data and the auditing results by an honest but
curious entity (auditor or tenant). More precisely, similar to existing works [23, 10,
47], we assume an adversary who will follow given protocols to access anonymized data














 data and auditing
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Figure 2: A summary of trust relationships.
about the cloud infrastructures or the tenants, if the protocols provide him/her such
an opportunity. We can distinguish the following types of attacks:
1. Individual attacks: This attack can be done by either a tenant or an auditor.
The goal of such attacks is to recover individual information about a specific
tenant, e.g., an attacker can identify a particular tenant based on the cloud
tenant identifier, and infer his/her private information, such as private IPs and
tenants’ relationships. Such an attack could either cause privacy breaches or
enable further more severe attacks.
2. Aggregate attacks: This attack can be done by an auditor. The goal of such
attacks is to recover general information about a subset of (or the entire) cloud
infrastructure, e.g., tenants’ virtual network topologies, known vulnerabilities
and communication relationships between different tenants. Such an attack
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could also have both security and privacy consequences.
3.2.1 Adversarial Knowledge
We consider adversaries with prior knowledge about the system and its data. Ex-
amples of information that may potentially be collected by the adversary include:
i) publicly available information (e.g., general information about the cloud and its
customers, system versions, current and planned usage); ii) prior resources (e.g., IPs
that have been leaked through previous breaches or attacks); iii) any information col-
lected from other resources or from the system itself (e.g., details about applications
and services to which the adversary has access to). Since a tenant or auditor may
easily possess all such information about a victim, it is mandatory to consider such
a practical adversarial model. Our methodology and experiments both take this into
consideration, and we study different cases of adversarial knowledge.
3.2.2 Out-of-Scope Threats
We do not consider malicious adversaries who deviate from given protocols. We also
consider the integrity or availability issues related to audit reports out-of-scope. We
focus on information leaked from audit data and audit report, and do not consider





This chpater details SegGuard methodology. We first present the main idea of our
approach then we provide an overview of its steps and finally we further detail each
step.
4.1 Main Idea
Before we delve into the details of SegGuard, we first build intuitions about its main
ideas by considering only three IP addresses from Figure 1. These are shown in Table 2
(second column under “Original IP”). As discussed in Chapter 1, the reachability
analysis can be performed on those IPs as long as their shared prefixes are preserved
(we will ignore other attributes for now). Roughly speaking (many details are omitted
and will be provided later in this chapter), SegGuard works as follows.
Original IP Encrypted with KT V0 Encrypted with KAn
Tenant1 1.10.10.1 93.14.36.9 1 45.17.7.9
Tenant1 1.10.10.2 93.14.15.14 2 132.6.4.66
Tenant1 1.10.6.5 93.14.22.8 3 201.47.96.23
Table 2: The CSP side.
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Received V1 Copy1 V2 Copy2 V3 Copy3
Tenant1 45.17.7.9 2 149.118.33.23 3 57.188.165.42 1 30.11.21.17
Tenant1 132.6.4.66 1 149.118.74.35 0 132.6.4.66 2 51.18.50.55
Tenant1 201.47.96.23 3 85.50.44.118 1 57.188.34.22 1 51.18.20.25
Table 3: The auditor side (where shaded IPs are utility-preserving and lead to valid
auditing results).
1. First, the CSP encrypts the original IP addresses using a key in which s/he
agrred on it with the each tenant (KT ) and a prefix-preserving encryption al-
gorithm, as shown in the third column of Table 2. Since all the later steps will
be layered upon this initial per-tenant encryption, and key KT is never shared
with other tenants, this step will ensure no cross-tenant information leakage
from the auditing results.
2. Next, the CSP generates a random integer vector V0 (fourth column), and the
second key KAn. It then encrypts each IP in third column (already encrypted
under KT ) iteratively, where each element of vector V0 indicates the number
of iterations applied, e.g., the first IP is encrypted once, and the second twice,
etc. We can notice that, since the number of iterations is different for each IP,
the results (shown in the last column) no longer contain any shared prefixes.
Those IPs in the last column are then sent to the auditor together with three
new vectors, V1, V2 and V3 (generated similarly as V0, and shown in Table 3).
3. Table 3 shows what happens at the auditor side. The auditor also applies the
same prefix-preserving encryption for different iterations based on the V1, V2,
and V3 vectors, similar to how the CSP has used V0. The resultant IPs are
shown in the columns next to their corresponding vectors. As those iterations
add up, shared prefixes start to appear, as shown with the gray shade, e.g.,
in the fourth column, the first two IPs share the same prefix 149.118, since
20
they have both been encrypted three times now (i.e., 1 + 2 = 3 and 2 + 1 = 3
for the first and second IPs, respectively). We can observe that, those vectors
are chosen in such a way, that exactly one pair of IPs share prefixes in every
copy, namely, utility-preserving IPs. However, although not shown in this toy
example, real audit data would also include a larger number of other IPs which
also share prefixes here at the auditor side, while they actually do not share
prefixes in the original IP column.
4. Next, the auditor performs the auditing task on each copy and obtains the
results for all the IPs. From above discussions, we know that, since there
is only one pair of utility-preserving IPs (the shaded ones) in each copy, the
results are only valid between those IPs. However, the auditor will not have
this knowledge, since the auditor does not know V0, and there exist many other
pairs IPs that also share prefixes in each copy as mentioned above.
5. Back to the CSP side, the CSP knows which IPs are utility-preserving since
s/he knows V0, so s/he extracts only the valid results from each copy, integrates
those results, and sends them to the tenants.
6. Each tenant decrypts his/her own IPs using KT to reveal the auditing results,
with other tenants’ IPs still encrypted.
4.2 Overview
To realize the above ideas, the SegGuard approach encompasses ten steps as de-
picated in Figure 3.
Steps 1-2: Initially, each tenant shares his/her key with the CSP (Step 1),
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Figure 3: An overview of SegGuard approach.
Steps 3-4: Next, the CSP aggregates all tenants’ data, divides it into segments (Step
3) and encrypts each segment (using key KAn shared between CSP and the auditor)
for different iteration based on a randomly generated vector (i.e., V0 in the previous
example). The output of this step is called the seed log (Step 4), as will be detailed
in Section 4.3.2 and Section 4.3.3.
Steps 5-6: The CSP shares the generated vectors and seed log with the auditor (Step
5). The auditor then applies those vectors to the seed log in order to generate multiple
views (called copies in Table 3) in which “real” (i.e., utility preserving) segments are
hidden among “fake” segments (Step 6). The fake segments in those views help to
hide from the auditor not only the sensitive attributes (e.g., the IPs) but also the
virtual topology, as will be detailed later. On the other hand, the real segments
scattered among those views help to guarantee the data utility, as the auditor will
unknowingly perform the requested auditing tasks on all the real segments, whose
union is exactly a utility-preserving copy of the originally anonymized data, as will
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be detailed in Section 4.3.4.
Steps 7-9: The auditor then performs auditing on the generated views (Step 7) and
sends the results to the CSP (Step 8). Then, the CSP identifies the real audit results
from each report, integrates them, and generates a per-tenant report (Step 9), as will
be detailed in Section 4.3.5.
Step 10: Finally, once each tenant receives the audit report, s/he decrypts his/her
own data inside the auditing report (Step 10), as will be detailed in Section 4.3.5.
4.3 Architecture
This Chapter describes the steps of SegGuard mechanism in details.
4.3.1 Per-Tenant Encryption
Steps 1-2 in Figure 3 provide the first layer of anonymization to preserve the privacy
of the sensitive attributes of each tenant. They are responsible for i) agreeing with
tenants on a secret key KT i and an initialization vector IVi from each tenant via
a trusted channel (Step 1 in Figure 3), and ii) encrypting each attribute of audit
data related to tenant Ti using (KT i, IVi) with the appropriate algorithm (Step 2 in
Figure 3) depending on the type of data (e.g., prefix-preserving encryption for IPs or
deterministic encryption for identifiers). The aggregated and encrypted data is then
passed to the next step.
Example 1. Table 4 illustrates the result of encrypted data of the configuration
table in Figure 1 using KT1 and KT2, respectively. IP addresses are encrypted while
preserving their prefixes.
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Tenant-ID Net-ID VM-ID VM-Pri-IP VM-Pub-IP Router-ID Next-Hop
9998 X1X VVV 66.22.10.3 18.12.12.14 WW1 YSE
9998 X3C MX2 66.22.7.66 18.12.12.16 WW3 YSE
5554 ZQA SQ1 98.6.36.82 101.2.42.9 WW4 JHQ
9998 X1X GTQ 66.22.17.34 18.12.12.7 WW1 EQW
5554 CCY TT2 98.6.41.13 101.2.42.13 WW5 JHQ
Table 4: Encrypted data corresponding to the original configuration table of Figure 1
performed by the CSP using KT1 (unshaded rows) and KT2 (shaded rows).
4.3.2 Data Segmentation
Step 3 provides the second layer of anonymization to protect the relationships between
data attributes, and hence the virtual topology. It takes two inputs: i) the aggregated
encrypted audit data of all tenants from the per-tenant encryption; ii) the parameters,
i.e., the total number of segments (Nseg) and the number of real segments per view
(Nseg−view), related to segmentation as chosen by the CSP, details about selection of
these parameters are discussed in Section 7.1. The CSP then performs the following
operations:
1. Computing number of views: The CSP computes the number of views




For a given value of Nseg−view, each view generated at the auditor would contain
Nseg segments in total where Nseg−view are real segments and the rests (i.e.,
Nseg−Nseg−view) are fake. For example, if we consider the case where Nseg−view =
2 and Nseg = 5 (as in Table 4), then, based on Equation 1, the auditor has to
generate 10 views.
2. Data segmentation: First, the data is sorted based on the tenant ID and
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network ID. Then, it is parceled among the Nseg segments in a round robin
fashion [29], (Step 3 in Figure 3) to ensure that each network spreads out to
minimize data relationships (e.g., network topology) leakage in the views gen-
erated later by the auditor. In SegGuard, the (anonymized) tenant ID is used
across different steps, i.e., data segmentation, auditing and result integration
for the purpose of identifying tenant’s assets. The output of this step is the
segmented log data, denoted by SegLog.
Example 2. Table 5 shows the result of sorting and segmenting the data, SegLog,
where a record in Table 4 represents one segment.
Tenant-ID Net-ID VM-ID VM-Pri-IP VM-Pub-IP Router-ID Next-Hop
9998 X1X VVV 66.22.10.3 18.12.12.14 WW1 YSE
5554 ZQA SQ1 98.6.36.82 101.2.42.9 WW4 JHQ
9998 X3C MX2 66.22.7.66 18.12.12.16 WW3 YSE
5554 CCY TT2 98.6.41.13 101.2.42.13 WW5 JHQ
9998 X1X GTQ 66.22.17.34 18.12.12.7 WW1 EQW
Table 5: SegLog corresponding to the encrypted and segmented data of Table 4
performed at the CSP side.
4.3.3 Utility Preserving Anonymization
The CSP first generates a set of utility parameters, (i.e., V0 - V3 in the example
discussed in Chapter 5), to be used to ensure the utility of SegLog and the final
audit results while protecting the data. Then based on these parameters, the CSP
applies a third (and final) set of transformations on SegLog before transferring it to
the auditor (Step 4 in Figure 3). This is detailed in the following:
Utility Preserving Parameters. The generated utility preserving parameters can
be classified into two categories:
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-Secret parameters: i) a random vector VRandom of dimension (Nseg ∗ 1), where ele-
ments are unique, randomly generated integer values and ii) set of vectors {V Pi}i∈Nviews
each of size (Nseg ∗ 1) where elements are integer values such that in each vector only
two elements are equal and at least one of those equal indices is different for any pair
of vectors. Algorithm 1 is used to generate vectors {V Pi}i∈Nviews .
-Parameters shared with the auditor: i) a matrix EncMatrix of size (Nseg ×Nviews)
and ii) an encryption key KAn. Elements of the EncMatrix are computed using
VRandom, {V Pi}i∈Nviews based on the following equation:
EncMatrix[i][j] = V P [i][j]− VRandom[j] (2)
Algorithm 1 GenerateVP
Input: Nviews, Nseg
Output: V P [Nviews][Nseg]
PtrX ← 2, P trY ← 1, intV P [][]← ∅, random[]← ∅
for (int i = 1; i <= Nviews; i++) do
for (int j = 1; j <= Nseg; j ++) do
random[j] = Rand() . Generate Random Number
if j + 1 == PtrX then
V P [i− 1][j] = random[PtrY − 1]
else
V P [i− 1][j] = random[j]




PtrX = PtrY + 1
return VP
The computed EncMatrix guarantees that in each view generated by the audi-
tor there are Nseg−view segments (called utility-preserved segments) encrypted equally
(i.e., for the same number of times) using the shared key KAn. Thus, the equality
property or shared prefixes are only preserved between those segments, and the au-
diting results of such segments will be valid. In contrast, the results for the remaining
segments are fake (i.e., invalid results that look indistinguishable from the valid re-
sults). This is meant to prevent the auditor from inferring the virtual topology of the
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cloud infrastructure as well as the verification results. Furthermore, as the sensitive
attributes are initially encrypted with tenants’ keys (which are not shared with the
auditor), the auditor cannot decrypt the sensitive attributes unless by brute forcing
this key (which will be discussed in Chapter 6). The following example shows how
the parameters are generated.
Example 3. For a log of five segments (Nseg = 5) and two real segments per view
(Nseg−view = 2), the CSP computes the following utility preserving parameters:























































































3. An encryption matrix EncMatrix (to be sent to the auditor) calculated as
(EncMatrix[i][j] = V P [i][j]− VRandom[j]), e.g., for the first two elemnts in the
first row 9 = 12− 3 and 12 = 15− 3:
EncMatrix =

9 12 15 13 8 10 15 8 16 8
7 6 8 9 14 9 8 10 9 9
11 13 9 14 17 14 13 16 14 10
10 7 11 10 11 7 10 11 10 12
6 15 10 12 9 8 9 9 12 15

Anonymization of SegLog. The ith segment in SegLog is then encrypted VRandom[i]
times usingKAn. After that, the rows of EncMatrix and the segments of the anonymized
SegLog are permuted together randomly to hide the position of the real segments in
the generated views. The result of this stage is denoted as SegLogp. Algorithm 2





EncMatrix=GenerateEncMatrix(VRandom,V Pi) . using Equation 2
SegLoge=EncryptSegLog(SegLog, VRandom,KAn)
EncMatrixp, SegLogp=Permute(EncMatrix, SegLoge) . permutation function
return V Pi, KAn, EncMatrixp, SegLogp
Example 4. Based on our running example, we show the encryption and permutation
steps:
1. The CSP encrypts each segment based on the values in VRandom (e.g., segment
number 1 will be encrypted 3 times using KAn).
2. After that, each row in the EncMatrix is paired with its corresponding segment
and randomly permuted (horizontal permutation). The resulting EncMatrixp




11 13 9 14 17 14 13 16 14 10
10 7 11 10 11 7 10 11 10 12
7 6 8 9 14 9 8 10 9 9
6 15 10 12 9 8 9 9 12 15
9 12 15 13 8 10 15 8 16 8

Tenant-ID Net-ID VM-ID VM-Pri-IP VM-Pub-IP Router-ID Next-Hop
3456 X12 WSA 69.35.7.92 1.10.10.1 WDS YSQ
8745 12W W5F 34.16.5.40 1.10.10.4 W5R RDP
5684 OI1 WE2 75.81.15.34 1.10.10.4 LA4 MVZ
6571 Q4E WQ1 74.99.41.52 1.10.10.1 W3S UZQ
9865 IO1 KK2 162.2.10.12 1.10.10.1 QW1 JAQ
Table 6: SegLogp after permutation.
4.3.4 Multi-View Generation
The auditor takes as input the utility parameters shared by the CSP, namely, EncMatrixp,
SegLogp, and KAn, and generates the multiple views to be audited as follows. Based
on the number of columns in EncMatrixp (i.e., Nviews), SegLogp is cloned into Nviews
copies, called views, and in each view, the total number of segments Nseg (i.e., the
number of rows of EncMatrixp) and the content of the segments are identified. Then,
each view j is encrypted using KAn and EncMatrixp, such that each segment i in
the view j is encrypted with KAn as many times as the corresponding value at (i, j)
in the EncMatrixp (Step 6 in Figure 3).
Example 5. Table 7 and Table 8 respectively show the first and second views gener-
ated by the auditor. The shaded segments are those parts that are real such that the
equality property and shared prefixes are preserved and their auditing would lead to
valid results. The other (unshaded) segments, indistinguishable from the real ones,
would lead to fake audit results.
Once all views are generated, the auditor analyzes them (Step 7 in Figure 3), and
sends the reports for each view back to the CSP (Step 8 in Figure 3), where each report
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Tenant-ID Net-ID VM-ID VM-Pri-IP VM-Pub-IP Router-ID Next-Hop
2478 11E I3I 63.89.65.15 1.10.10.1 KL6 MZN
5678 4F3 9KL 89.698.45.6 1.10.10.5 OP3 ASP
7231 LX2 WSA 87.65.7.2 1.10.10.1 WDS GH3
6761 CNN M8P 36.74.51.46 1.10.10.3 HN3 L4U
7231 NJ2 KFD 87.65.7.65 1.10.10.1 NW1 GH3
Table 7: First view generated by the auditor. Shaded segments are real segments
(between which equality or shared prefixes are preserved) and unshaded rows are fake
ones.
Tenant-ID Net-ID VM-ID VM-Pri-IP VM-Pub-IP Router-ID Next-Hop
5143 23E 2K1 98.62.1.71 1.10.10.5 PLM GH9
7238 1W2 VCS 14.15.89.54 1.10.10.2 PP9 3KY
9651 DDF MNI 25.6.99.11 1.10.10.5 HMH IS1
3456 4TF WSA 18.2.6.12 1.10.10.1 NF5 T5R
7676 GGF WQ1 17.2.9.24 1.10.10.1 NJ1 MQF
Table 8: Second view generated by the auditor. Shaded segments are real segments
and unshaded rows are fake ones.
is identified using the column index in EncMatrix used to obtain the corresponding
view. Note that the security group rules depicted in Figure 1 is encrypted exactly
the same way (omitted due to space limitation), which is used together with Table 7
and 8 to generate Figure 4.
Example 6. Figure 4 shows the constructed virtual topologies from the first two
generated views in Tables 7 and 8. As we can see, the generated topologies are
different from the original topology shown in Figure 1 from several perspectives: e.g.,
the number of tenants, the number of gateway routers, and virtual infrastructure
identifiers. Only a portion of the original topology is preserved in each view (shown
with a boldface dashed lines). A malicious auditor trying to recover the virtual
network topology, cannot effectively distinguish the real part of the topology from
the fake one. Then, the auditor performs reachability verification between all pairs of
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VMs in each view (e.g., using NoD [22]). The audit report includes all pairs of tuples
(i.e., Tenant-ID, VM-ID, VM-IP, Network-ID, etc.) in the view and their reachability
results (reachable/not reachable).
IF-XZ3IF-XZ2IF-XZ1 IF-XZ4 IF-XZ5



































Figure 4: Network topologies inferred from two generated views (together with the
encrypted SGR table not shown here): (a) topology related to first view in Table 7,
(b) topology related to second view in Table 8. The gray dashed lines are fake and
boldface dashed lines are real.
4.3.5 Per-Tenant Report Integration
This step runs at the CSP side and takes as input the reports received from the auditor
and their identifiers as described in the previous Chapter, recovers the correct results
from all reports for all tenants, and then prepares a per-tenant report (Step 9 in
Figure 3). The main operations performed by this step are as follows.
Real Results Extraction and Integration. Report integration (identification of
real audit results from fake) can be prepared in advance by CSP. More precisely, for
each view i, the secret vector V Pi is used to identify the number of times in total the
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key KAn is used to encrypt each segment of this view. Such that, the positions of
equal elements in V Pi with the SegLog records are used to identify the real segments
in each view. Thus, view (report) IDs, tuples of information from SegLog, the same
tuples encrypted using KAn and the equal V Pi elements (i.e., underlined elements),
are stored locally in the ReportPrep table to be used as follows. Algorithm 3 shows
the steps of report integration.
Algorithm 3 ReportsIntegrationPreparation
Input: V P [Nviews][Nseg], SegLog
Output: ReportPrep
index← ∅, val← ∅, ReportPrep[]← ∅
for (inti = 1; i <= Nviews; i++) do
(index,val)=RepeatedElements(VP[i]) . find real segments and equal VP elements
RealSeg=ExtractRealSeg(index) . function to extract segments data assigned index
ReportPrep[i] = (i,RealSeg,val)
return ReportPrep
Example 7. Table 9 shows the example of data extracted and stored to correctly
integrate the reports.
Report-ID Tenant-ID VM-ID VM-IP Enc-Num
1 9998 VVV 66.22.10.3 129998 MX2 66.22.7.66
2 9998 VVV 18.12.12.14 155554 SQ1 101.2.42.9
Table 9: Excerpt of ReportPrep prepared by the CSP for the integration of the first
two reports.
Per-tenant Report integration and Forwarding. Once all reports are received,
the CSP uses the ReportPrep table to search in each report the encrypted results
corresponding to the real segments generated by tha auditor and discard the others.
Once the results are identified, the CSP replaces the encrypted data in the reports
with the data encrypted using tenants’ keys KT i that is the one stored in ReportPrep
Table 9, Algorithm 4 implements the preparation for report reception.
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Algorithm 4 ReportsIntegration
Input: ReportPrep[ ],viewReport[ ]
Output: TenantReports[tenantid][report]
for (inti = 1; i <= Nviews; i++) do
EncryptedRealSeg=findEncSeg(i,ReportPrep) . function to find real encrypted
segments in view i
Result=FindInReports(EncryptedRealSeg, viewReport) . function to find real results
and discard fake
TenantReports[tenant-id][i]= ReportPerTenant(Result, i) . function to store tenants
results encrypted using their keys
return TenantReports
To avoid any leak from verification results, the CSP forwards per-tenant encrypted
report, such that each tenant can only decrypt his/her own data. Meanwhile, all data
related to other tenants, are encrypted by other tenants’ keys. Thus, SegGuard allows
each tenant to access the plain IDs and IPs for his/her own resources while s/he is
able to have an encrypted evidence about their audit breaches with other tenants,
which allows preserving the privacy of sensitive attributes of other tenants. Finally,
each tenant Ti decrypts the report using his/her key KTi (Step 10 in Figure 3).
Example 8. Table 10 shows the final auditing reports forwarded to Tenant1 (Tenant-
ID: 1234 ). Table 11 shows the final decrypted auditing reports of Tenant1 (Tenant-
ID: 1234 ) using KT1. Based on Table 11, Tenant1 can only see its assets’ IDs (e.g.,
CD1, CD2, 1234 ) and IPs (e.g., 1.10.10.1 ) while the identifiers of the other tenant
(encrypted Tenant-ID: 5554 ) are still encrypted using his/her key (e.g., TT2, and
101.2.42.13 ).
Tenant-ID VM-ID VM-IP Tenant-ID VM-ID VM-IP Result
9998 VVV 18.12.12.14 5554 TT2 101.2.42.13 Reachable
9998 MX2 66.22.7.66 9998 GTQ 66.22.17.34 Reachable
9998 GTQ 66.22.17.34 9998 MX2 66.22.7.66 Reachable
Table 10: Final report for Tenant1.
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Tenant-ID VM-ID VM-IP Tenant-ID VM-ID VM-IP Result
1234 CD1 1.10.10.1 5554 TT2 101.2.42.13 Reachable
1234 CD2 27.0.2.9 1234 CD3 27.0.3.27 Rechable
1234 CD3 27.0.3.27 1234 CD2 27.0.2.9 Rechable





In this chapter, we detail the implementation of SegGuard and its integration into
OpenStack. This chapter also provide an overview of the environment and the tools
we use to implement SegGuard.
5.1 Background
OpenStack [37] is an open-source cloud infrastructure management platform that
uses a set of software tools for managing and building large pools of compute, storage
and networking resources. OpenStack is one of the most extensively deployed infras-
tructure management platforms in today’s data centers [17]. The implementation of
SegGuard mainly involves Nova and Neutron, which are the two main management
layer services for the creation and maintenance of virtual infrastructure and network-
ing in the cloud. First, Nova is a compute service that provides tenants on-demand
self-service access to compute resources in order to create VMs. Additionally, it al-
lows the creation and maintenance of security groups that play the role of virtual
firewalls for the VMs. Second, Neutron is a networking project focused on delivering
networking services. This will allow tenants to create and maintain virtual networks
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between their VMs and connecting their virtual infrastructures to external networks.
5.2 SegGuard Integration into OpenStack
Figure 5 illustrates a high-level architecture of SegGuard and shows how it performs
the aforementioned steps at three levels: CSP, tenants, and auditor. Our approach
interacts with OpenStack services to collect various types of audit data, and with the
CSP to obtain the parameters. Specifically, SegGuard is integrated into OpenStack
by deploying three main components:
1) Data Collector and Parser Engine: This component interacts with Nova and
Neutron OpenStack components and OpenDaylight controller to retrieve the config-
uration data stored in databases using SQL queries. For instance, VM ports, router
interfaces, router gateways and other virtual ports are collected from table ports in
Neutron database. Therein, device owner and device ID fields in these tables are used
to infer the relationship between the virtual ports and their corresponding devices.
We also collect the private and public IPs of VMs from instances table, as well as
security groups and rules from the routerrules, subnetroutes and securitygrouprules
tables, where rules are represented by IP destination-nexthop data pairs. Also, Open-
Daylight defines a unique flow-ID for each virtual network and maintains its current
flow states. The collected data is duplicated in the SegGuard database to facilitate
more efficient local processing. Then, as the data is scattered over different tables,
the engine performs several data pre-processing and filtering steps, such as removing
unnecessary data, aggregating relevant data and sorting it based on tenants’ identi-
fiers.
2) Data Anonymizer Engine: This component performs SegGuard operations at
the CSP side, where it takes as input the tenants and CSP keys, the number of seg-
ments and real segments per view, and data collected and parsed by the data collector
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and parser engine as detailed in Chapter 4. The output of this module is the seed log
and EncMatrixp.
3) Anonymization Evaluator Engine: This component performs two main steps.
First, it plays the role of data auditor and takes as input the seed log and the
EncMatrixp to generate the multiple views. Second, the engine evaluates the topol-
ogy changes between the original data and generated views by the analyst by pro-
viding a summary statistics of these differences. This engine is used to evaluate the























Data Anonymizer Engine 
Anonymization Evaluator Engine 


















Figure 5: A high-level architecture of SegGuard.
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5.3 Encryption algorithms
There are two main types of processed data to be anonymized: infrastructure IDs
(256 bits) and network components IPs (32 bits). We use two types of data encryp-
tion algorithms: To encrypt infrastructure IDs, we use the deterministic Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [16], and we use the Prefix-Preserving Anonymization,
influenced by [51], to encrypt the infrastructure IPs, with 256-bit encryption keys
for both algorithms. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness, applicability and effi-
ciency of SegGuard, we conduct experiments of SegGuard based on both synthetic




In the following, we first analyze the security and the utility of our solution.
6.1 Security Analysis
We analyze the level of security offered by SegGuard to protect the topology infor-
mation and sensitive attributes, respectively (all the communications are assumed to
be over secure channels).
6.1.1 Security of the Topology Information
Generally speaking, existing anonymization techniques would leak important topology
information, if we were to apply them directly to our case. For example, directly
applying the deterministic encryption and prefix-preserving encryption will preserve
both the equality between identifiers and shared prefixes between IPs. As a result,
the relationships between virtual resources, e.g., whether two VMs are reachable,
will also be preserved in the anonymized audit data. Therefore, the auditor still can
potentially construct the real topology of the entire cloud infrastructure based on the
anonymized audit data.
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In contrast, SegGuard provides strong protection of such topology information
from the auditor through its segmentation-based, layered encryption technique, as
introduced in the previous chapter. Specifically, recall that, as demonstrated in Chap-
ter 5, the seed log does not preserve either the equality property or the shared prefixes,
which means the auditor cannot recover any topology information from the seed log.
In addition, since the auditor cannot identify the few real segments from a much
larger number of fake segments, s/he only has a slim chance to recover such infor-
mation from the generated views, as will be detailed below and evaluted in the next
chapter.
Specifically, as the secret utility parameters are keys to SegGuard’s security, we
consider a brute force attack performed by an adversary to guess the secret utility
parameters in an attempt to recover the utility preserved segments from all views and
identify the topology. To this end, the adversary has two choices: to guess either i)
VRandom and use Equation 2 with EncMatrix to compute all V Pi or ii) all V Pi in
order to recover the original data from all views. In the following, we show that the
likelihood of an adversary to succeed in recovering either vector is very low.
The probability of an adversary guessing VRandom depends on the size of the domain
D for the random number generation (which is only known by the CSP) and the size





(D − 1) ∗ ... ∗
1
D −NSeg (3)
The probability of an adversary guessing one of the V Pi depends on the size of the
domain for the random number generation D, the size of the vectors Nseg, and the
number of views to be generated by the auditor Nviews, and can be computed as
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follows:
P (V Pi) = (




For instance, for Nseg = 4 and D = 200, the probability to guess the correct VRandom
is less than 1 ∗ 10−9. Note that, the probability to guess one V Pi (for example, with
Nviews = 6) is even smaller and the adversary needs to recover all of the six V Pis to
recover all real segments. Thus, even with a reasonable domain size, it is relatively
difficult for an adversary to recover the original topology.
Finally, the EncMatrix is generated randomly using a uniform distribution over
X, so the probability to generate any value in the matrix would be 1
X
, which is
not considered as information leakage according to the theory of secure multiparty
computation [53] since it can be simulated in a polynomial time.
6.1.2 Security of the Sensitives Attributes
To protect the confidentiality of the sensitive attributes, SegGuard leverages sym-
metric key encryption and prefix preserving anonymization techniques in a special
manner and rely on the security of the symmetric key encryption algorithms [16].
We use 256-bit encryption keys for both encryption algorithms used in SegGuard.
Furthermore, it is well known that generally for any key K and plaintext X, it’s
computationally infeasible to compute K given (X)K . We are assuming that the gen-
erated tenants keys and the shared key between CSP and auditor are shared through
a secure channel (e.g., publick key infrastructure).
On the other hand, all prefix preserving schemes are subject to a special type of
attacks known as the semantic attacks to the same degree. Semantic attacks allow
the attackers to infer a prefix or the whole unanonymized addresses by exploiting the
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cryptanalysis techniques and the prefix preserving semantics. Semantic attacks can
be categorized into two forms:
1. Injection attack: In this type of attacks, the adversary injects original data with
arbitrary source and destination IP addresses or forging the IP addresses so
that they become distinguishable in its anonymized form for later recognition
purposes [44]. However, this attack is less likely to be achieved in the cloud
infrastructure environment. Whereas, cloud configuration data are based on
real cloud operations and tenants can only perform operations based on the
capabilities assigned to them by CSP (e.g., create VM, create SGR). So that,
a malicious tenant can only inject records into his configuration data (e.g., by
generating legitimate operations in his domain within the permissions assigned
to him), but cannot inject such data into other tenants’ configuration data
without compromising the cloud infrastructure.
2. Frequency analysis attack: The frequency analysis attack [7], is performed based
on adversary has a certain level of knowledge on the attacked data. This attack
returns all possible matches between original and prefix-preserved anonymized
IP addresses. It builds a probabilistic model based on the prefixes in data that
are within his knowledge and another model for those IPs in the anonymized
version of the data, then it starts a matching process between these two models
and ends up with a set of deanonymized IP addresses. Moreover, the adversary’s
knowledge is gained from a carefully designed injection attack [7], inferring the
most popular IP addresses with high frequency of occurrence or from adversary’s
prior knowledge of the traffic distribution [44]. Nevertheless, if the adversary
manages to have a certain level of knowledge, namely pre-knowledge, about
other tenants’ infrastructures (e.g., IP, virtual resources, etc.), our approach
hides the real semantic of the configuration data in the anonymized data which
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makes launching frequency attacks useless for the attacker. More precisely,
SegGuard encrypts tenants’ data with their respective own keys, distributes
the records among different segments, and re-encrypts these segments different
times using the key KAn such that the IP addresses within the same subnet
and located in different segments will have different prefixes. Consequently, the
IPs belonging to the same tenants will not share the same prefixes if they are
not in the utility preserved segments. In summary, our approach preserves the
relationships for each tenant in the utility preserving segments. Meanwhile, in
other segments it is not preserved. This is demonstrated in Chapter 8, where
we verify the impact of this type of attacks by implementing and testing the
frequency analysis attack with some adaptations. We define the information
leakage resulting from this attack as follows: Information Leakage: The number
of deanonymized IP addresses after applying the frequency analysis attack on
the anonymized log generated by the SegGuard approach over the total number
of the original IP addresses.
6.2 Utility Analysis
Our solution can be shown to be utility preserving based on the following four prop-
erties:
1. The use of deterministic encryption guarantees that encrypting the same mes-
sage with the same initialization vector and key returns always the same cipher-
text, for the same tenant. Thus, the same messages before encryption will be
mapped to the same messages after encryption (e.g., resources identifiers and
their relationships). For example, the tenant-ID allows identifying the owner
of a resource. If the same tenant-ID is not mapped consistently, it might affect
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the auditing process and cause an incorrect auditing result.
2. The use of per-tenant encryption using tenants specific keys KT i guarantees
that private IP addresses from different tenants will be mapped to different IP
addresses to prevent collision. Note that, different tenants can have the same
value for different sensitive attributes. For example, the same private IP address
10.5.10.10 in both tenants T1 and T2 is converted to two different IP addresses
124.13.10.12 and 73.48.15.12. after per-tenant encryption.
3. The use of the prefix-preserving anonymization guarantees that IP addresses
belong to the same subnet will belong to the same subnet in the anonymized
trace. This ensures the utility of data for an audit task that relies on IP ad-
dresses and their relationships (e.g., sharing the same prefix). However, the lack
of this kind of anonymization results in unusable logs [30, 52]. For instance, the
IP addresses of different VMs in the same network should share the same length
of prefix after anonymization.
4. The multi-view approach guarantees that the original data can be completely
and undistorted audited by verifying the generated views individually. The
generated utility preserving parameters in are the key in ensuring this compo-
sitionally auditing.
In summary, the aforementioned discussion shows how the utility of the data will
be preserved by SegGuard in a multi-tenant environment where resources can have
the same identifiers/addresses.
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6.3 Security of the Communications
All shared keys that involved different parties are assumed to be agreed and dis-
tributed among secure channels. Furthermore, the EncMatrix and seed log are
transmitted from CSP to the auditor. As discussed earlier, this matrix solely cannot
be used to leak any information useful for the adversary. Furthermore, as the equality
property and the shared prefixes are both not preserved in the seed log using seg-
mentation and layered encryption, an adversary cannot infer any information about
neither the attributes nor their relationships. Additionally, the reports generated by
the auditors are encrypted using the secret key KAn agreed between the auditor and
the CSP to prevent any MiTM. Furthermore, the report integration module provides
a second layer of protection as it generates per-tenant reports to prevent a tenant
obtains a copy of other tenants’ auditing results. Additionally, all sensitive attributes
in the retrieved reports are encrypted either using the key of the receiving tenant
or using the other tenants’ keys to prevent information leakage across tenants. The
per-tenant encryption ensures that if all reports fall within adversary hands, they can-





This chapter discusses several aspects of SegGuard.
7.1 Computational Cost and Benign Auditor
By preserving data utility, our solution essentially imposes a tradeoff between security
and computational cost. Specifically, the selection of the utility parameters (i.e.,
Nseg and Nseg−view) in Section 4.3.2 determines the level of security and privacy
protection provided by our approach, as well as its computational cost. These two
parameters determine the number of views to be generated and audited by the auditor.
A larger number of views certainly implies a higher level of security and privacy but
a higher computational cost as well. In practice, the CSP can select the values of
these parameters based on the security and privacy requirements and the amount of
computation cost s/he can afford. If the CSP has ahigher level of trust in a given
auditor, e.g., its own employees such as cloud administrators, s/he can reduce the
computation cost by decreasing the number of views to be generated. To do so, CSP
can either decrease the number of utility segments per view or choose a small number
of segments in the first place. In contrast, for less trusted third-party auditors, the
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CSP can increase those parameters to improve the security.
7.2 Colluding Adversaries
If two or more adversary tenants collaborate to infer information about other benign
tenants, the CSP can react in two ways. First, if two or more tenants choose the same
key accidentally or intentionally, the CSP should detect and revoke those keys, since
failing to do so would allow a higher proportion of its topology to be disclosed to
those adversaries. Second, if a tenant and an auditor collude, it would be equivalent
to an adversary having more prior knowledge about the data (i.e., the data of the
colluding tenant) launching the frequency analysis attack. As we have shown through
experiments, SegGuard is robust against such adversaries as we will discuss in the
experimental results chapter 8.
7.3 Auditing Static Cloud Configurations
SegGuard supports auditing on cloud configurations collected as snapshots through
our data collection engine (as described in Chapter 5). Through our experimental
results (in Chapter 8), we show that our approach is practical for auditing large-sized
clouds, e.g., 62 seconds to anonymize data related to 26 thousand VMs. However,
an incremental approach of SegGuard will allow collecting, processing and auditing
a small amount of configuration changes more efficiently, which we consider as an
interesting future work.
47
7.4 Communication and Storage Costs
SegGuard supports both third party and in-house auditors. In the third party au-
diting case, transmitting the anonymized audit data and other necessary parameters
may involve certain communication cost. However, note that our design of the seed
log means only one copy of the audit data will need to be sent over the network in such
a case, even though the auditor will need to generate multiple views later on his/her
site. On the other hand, if the auditor is a cloud administrator or the third party
auditor remotely logins to perform in-cloud auditing, then no data would need to be
sent over the network. In both cases, the storage cost for storing the multiple views
could be a concern especially when the number of views is large. One easy way to
mitigate this issue is to generate, audit, and then delete each view before generating
the next view, assuming the auditing results have lower storage requirements.
7.5 Formal Treatment and Applicability on Differ-
ent Attributes
This work mainly leverages existing crypto primitives such as PPE, permutation and
RNG, which allows preserving the prefixes and equality properties for utility purposes.
Consequently, the security of our solution is depending on those techniques. These
primitives are known to have some weaknesses, but we overcome their weaknesses
using the segmentation, where there is a partial preservation of these properties in
each view (each view mixed with real and fake segments). We have focused on the
system aspect of the solution rather on the formal analysis of the security. That is said,
we have performed an informal analysis in the security analysis Chapter 6 and the
experimental results Chapter 8, where we measured the information leakage caused
by attacks against PPE such as fingerprinting and injection that we implemented
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and run over our datasets. Our solution can employ any PPE techniques (equality-
preserving, prefix-preserving, order-preserving, format preserving, etc.) on any data
attribute (e.g., Timestamp, string, integer) with little modification. As such, the IP
addresses and the identifiers (e.g., tenant id, network id) are only meant as examples
of property preservation encryption (PPE) techniques.
7.6 Use-Cases of SegGuard
We believe that our solution can be applied to any system has different actors with
different trust level. For example, in the Central Authentication Services (CAS)
applications which involve three parties: client browser, web application and CAS
server that has a DB server which communicates with the web application through
it. Another use-case could the foreign network firewalls where roaming users are
using encrypted channels to protect the security and privacy of their communication,
but their data cannot be examined and regulated by foreign networks firewalls. This
problem can be relieved if users reveal their data or if the foreign networks reveal their
firewalls rules to the tunnels endpoints. With these conflicting security and privacy
requirements, it is very difficult to regulate the encrypted tunnels using conventional
firewall techniques, because they all require a single entity to possess knowledge on
both the connection characteristics and the firewall rules. However, using our solution,
the firewall will play the rule of the auditor and the users can play the rule of the
CSP and the tenants together. Furthermore, our solution can be applied to encrypted
and secure storage DB in order to hide the hierarchy and relationships between data
attributes in a database storage system. Finally, we will leave the discussions of





This chapter presents experimental results measuring the effectiveness and efficiency
of SegGuard.
8.1 Experimental Setup
In the following experiments, we use both real and synthetic data. Real data consists
of two different datasets provided by two major telecommunication companies. The
first dataset contains 10K distinct IP addresses, and is used to validate our approach
against the frequency analysis attack. The second one is virtual network configuration
data from a real cloud environment with 22 physical machines, 37 tenants and 4,377
VMs, and used to study the applicability of our approach as discussed. Furthermore,
we used a synthetic dataset collected from our testbed deployment of OpenStack
(version Kilo) cloud environment in order to simulate a large cloud deployment of
1.2K virtual routers, 3.2K subnets, 25.2K different VMs and 43K IP addresses.1
Finally, our scripts for the experiments implemented in C++ and bash were run on
a PC with Debian 13.6 64-bits, Intel Core i7 CPU, and 16GB memory.
1This is considered a large cloud according to [39] as 94% of OpenStack deployments have less
than 10K distinct IP addresses.
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8.2 Information Leakage under Semantic Attacks
In this chapter, we evaluate the effectiveness of SegGuard by examining the informa-
tion leakage (Chapter 2) of our solution under the Frequency Analysis Attack defined
in Chapter 6, based on the data generated by both the CSP (seed log) and the auditor
(all views), while varying four main parameters: the number of segments (Nseg), the
number of real segments per view (Nseg−view), the adversary knowledge and the num-
ber of VMs deployed in the cloud. In the following, we discuss the obtained results
in detail.
8.2.1 Impact of Varying the Number of Segments
In this experiment, we analyze the information leakage for a 10K VMs log against
an adversary with 25% knowledge of the original data while varying the number of
segments. Figure 6 shows that the information leakage decreases abruptly when the
number of segments increases. As expected, while increasing the number of segments,
the IP addresses with the same prefixes are distributed further among these segments,
which causes the information leakage to decrease. Indeed, applying different layers
of anonymization for different segments results in IP addresses that were originally
sharing the same prefix to have different prefixes. Thus, when the adversary calculates
the frequencies of the original log based on his/her pre-knowledge, s/he is not able to
find them on the anonymized version of the log.
8.2.2 Impact of Varying the Number of Real Segments/View
In this experiment, we analyze the information leakage for 10 segments and 25% of
adversary knowledge while varying the number of real segment per view. Figure 7
shows that the information leakage increases steadily when the number of real (utility
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Figure 6: Information leakage of SegGuard under frequency analysis attack while
varying the number of segments. The advers ry knowledge to 25%, the number of
VMs to 10K and the number of real segments per view to 2.
preserving) segments increases per view. This is expected because, having a large
number of utility preserving segments per view increases the chances that the IPs
that were originally sharing the same prefixes are also sharing again the same prefixes
in the same view. This makes it easier for the adversary to deanonymize them. In the
worst case, when we have 10 real segments out of 10 segments, the whole log is prefix-
preserved (and the equality property holds) a d thus an adversary can deanonymize
1.2K of the IPs, which represents 12% of the whole log. However, when the number
of real segments is only two, the adversary can only deanonymize 22 IPs from the
whole log, which represents 0.22%. Note that this leakage percentage is computed
over all IPs of all tenants in the data center that are within the adversary knowledge.
Our data segmentation approach ensures that the utility preserving segments related
to a single tenant are spread over multiple views. Thus, relatively to a given tenant,
this percentage is even smaller. We also note as discussed in Chapter 7, for a given
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number of utility-preserved segments per view, the larger number of segments, the
lower the level of information leakage is and thus the higher would be the auditing
cost (as the number of views to be audited increases).
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Figure 7: Information leakage of SegGuard under frequency analysis attack while
varying the number of real segments/view. The adversary knowledge to 25%, the
number of VMs to 10K, the number of segments to 10.
8.2.3 Impact of Varying the Adversary Knowledge
In this experiment, we analyze the information leakage whan we have 10 segments and
two real segments per view, while varying the adversary knowledge from 10% to 50%
of the 10K VMs. Figure 8 shows the information leakage increases slightly with the
adversary knowledge (e.g., when adversary knowledge increases from 10% to 50%, the
information leakage increases by 0.1%) but stays under a maximum of 0.23%. Such
a small percentage of information leakage results from the data segmentation which
parcels the data records with the same IP prefixes over several segments, and thus
make same IP sharing the same prefixes to be encrypted with different number of
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layered encryption. Therefoe, when an adversary builds the probabilistic model for
both original and anonymized logs, he cannot find matches across segments. Finally,
for the retrieved deanonymized IPs, there could be distinct IPs that are within the
adversary knowledge and appear once in the anonymized log.
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Figure 8: Information leakage of SegGuard under frequency analysis attack while
varying the adversary knowledge. The number of VMs to 10K, the number of seg-
ments to 10, and the number of real segments per view to 2.
8.2.4 Impact of Varying the Number of VMs
Figure 9 shows the information leakage as a function of the number of VMs in the log
for a fixed adversary knowledge of 25%, 10 segments and two real segments/view. The
figure shows that the percentage of information leakage is independent of the size of
the log. Thus, for different number of VMs, the adversary can only gain a relatively
small amount of knowledge. For instance, for the largest dataset, the information
leakage is 0.20%. The maximum information leakage is 0.21% that is achieved for a
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log size of 6K VMs. Thus, there is no real impact of different sizes of the log on the
level of security and privacy offered by our approach.
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Figure 9: Information leakage of SegGuard under frequency analysis attack while
varying the number of segments. The adversary knowledge to 25%, the number of
segments to 10, and the number of real segments per view to 2.
8.3 Topology Preservation in Real Cloud
For this experiment, we used the dataset provided from a real cloud data center
to show the applicability of SegGuard to anonymize the network topology in real
cloud deployment. Particularly, we show how these relationships change between
different views generated by SegGuard. Figure 10.(A) illustrates the actual structure
of this data center, where it is composed of two racks, Rack1 and Rack2, connected to
two edge switches, namely Edg11 and Edg12, which are connected to two aggregate
switches, namely Agg11 and Agg12. Each rack consists of 11 physical servers and
hosts assets from 37 tenants.
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We anonymize the configuration data corresponding to this setup using SegGuard,
where we set the number of segments to four and the number of real segments per
view to two. After that, we selected two random views generated by the auditor
and visualized their corresponding topology as illustrated in Figure 10.(B) and Fig-
ure 10.(C). As we can see, the total number of tenants in the former figure is 131 while
in latter it is 107, which are different from the real settings. This is due to the fact
that since the tenants’ identifiers are spread over the four segments and encrypted
different number of times using the key. Particularly, the same tenant identifier will
be mapped to different values depending on the segment index and the generated
view. Thus, it will appear as a different tenant in each view. The same scenario
happens with the identifiers of the virtual resources, the physical servers, the racks,
as well as the edge and aggregation switches.
8.4 Efficiency of SegGuard
To measure the performance of our approach, we run our approach on a large dataset
of 25.2K VMs and their associated security group policies and measured the time as
well as memory and CPU consumptions while varying the number of segments and
the range of random values, respectively.
8.4.1 Time Consumption
Figure 11 shows that the time required to prepare the seed log linearly increases with
the number of segments. The time difference between having one segment and 20
segments is about 36 seconds.
Figure 12 shows the time consumption when varying the domain of the random
generator used to set the values of the vector VRandom and the set of vectors V Pi.
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It shows that by increasing the random number domain, the required time increases
exponentially. However, the security-level offered by our solution is considered suf-
ficient even for a reasonably chosen random domain size. For instance, the required
time to generate the seed log by the CSP is about 62 seconds for a domain of 102. For
the adversary, if the random number domain is 200 and the NSeg = 3, then based on
Equation 3 there are (200 ∗ 199 ∗ 198) candidates vectors VRandom that the adversary
has to consider to deanonymize the log. This roughly translates into 15.5 years for
the adversary to find the correct V Random, with a machine having the same speci-
fication as the one described in the experimental setup. Note that, we consider the
computation consumption at the cloud provider as the latter is more concerned with
the amount of resources s/he needs to put in place for the anonymization process
before actually transmitting the information to the analyst. We consider the more
detailed evaluation of this issue as future work.
8.4.2 Memory and CPU Consumption
Figure 13 shows that the CPU consumption increases almost linearly from 32.6% to
34.93%, while varying the number of segments from 1 to 20, due to the encryption
operations applied to each segment based on the value of VRandom.
Figure 14 reports memory consumption, the slope of the memory consumption
increases linearly with the number of segments due to the multiple read/write oper-
ations on each segment to encrypt its records. However, it reaches 3.93% when the
number of segments is equal 20. This shows the efficiency of our solution from CPU
and memory consumptions perspectives.
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8.4.3 Results Summary
In summary, our experiments show the efficiency of our solution in terms of computa-
tional cost. SegGuard can anonymize data belonging to a large-scale cloud environ-






































Figure 10: Network topology corresponds to two different views selected randomly
from the views generated by SegGuard; where we set the Nseg to 4 and the Nseg−view
to 2. The total number of tenants in figure B is 131 while in C it is 107, which are
different from the real settings.
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Figure 11: Efficiency of SegGuard: Measuring (a) Time while varying the number
of segments and measuring (b) Time while varying the size of the domain of the
random number.
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Figure 12: Efficiency of SegGuard: Measuring time while varying the size of the
domain of the random number.
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Figure 13: Efficiency of SegGuard: Measuring CPU consumption consumption
while varying the number of segments.
10 2 10 3 10 4 10 5 10 6
















    of SegGuard

















    of SegGuard
















    of SegGuard






















Figure 14: Efficiency of SegGuard: Measuring Memory consumption while varying




In this thesis, we presented a novel anonymization approach that limited the leakage
of sensitive and private information from either the audit data or audit results in a
multi-tenancy cloud, while preserving sufficient utility for effective security auditing.
Our solution, SegGuard, could allow cloud server provider and tenants to benefit
from security auditing done by a semi-trusted auditor without leaking sensitive in-
formation about the Cloud server provider, including topology information, to the
auditor, or leaking such information across tenants. We evaluated both the effective-
ness and efficiency of our solution. Also, we showed the efficiency of our approach
since SegGuard can anonymize data consisting of 25.2K VMs in an acceptable time
as well as memory and CPU consumptions are acceptable. The main limitations of
our work and corresponding future directions are as follows. First, we do not consider
the integrity of audit data and audit results, which could potentially be addressed
with existing integrity mechanisms; we also fully rely on the CSP and assume an
honest but curious adversary model, so to what extent can those assumptions be
weakened will need to be studied. Second, we have mainly focused on prefix pre-
serving encryption, and a future direction is to expand our scope by incorporating
other property-preserving anonymization techniques, and also by studying whether
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the segmentation-based approach can even be used to hide original data to facilitate
auditing tasks that require such data (e.g., the payload). Third, to preserve data util-
ity, our approach basically imposes a trade-off between privacy and computational
cost, so optimizing such a trade-off is also an interesting future topic.
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